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Abstract 
 
Some economists worry about the ‘spaghetti bowl phenomenon’ expected from proliferating 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). In particular, the complicated web of hub-and-spoke type 
of overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs) can result in high costs for verifying rules of 
origin (RoO) and trade diversion or suppression effects. This explains why almost half of the 
RTAs notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are currently inactive. This research attempts to provide best practices 
for RTAs to enhance global free trade by mitigating these negative effects. More specifically, 
we quantitatively estimate the trade creation and diversion effects of harmonized and 
cumulated RoO (bilateral, diagonal, and full cumulation) for RTAs established under GATT 
Article XXIV and under the Enabling Clause by adopting a Gravity regression analysis. We 
find that (i) RTAs in general create trade among members and divert trade from nonmembers; 
(ii) RTAs should be established under the comprehensive GATT Article XXIV, rather than the 
piecemeal Enabling Clause; and (iii) full cumulation is the most optimal provision in terms of 
creating the most intra-bloc trade and diverting the least extra-bloc trade. Overall, we 
strongly recommend that RTAs should employ full cumulation of RoO under GATT Article 
XXIV. This strategy will enable regionalism to be compatible with multilateralism, to be 
sustainable in the long run, and finally to lead us to global free trade. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been revitalized since the successful 
evolution of the European and the North American integration in the late 1980s. The rapid 
progress in market-driven regionalization in East Asia since the financial crisis of late 1990s 
has accelerated the worldwide regionalization movement. In addition, the recent failure of the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round in Geneva is 
likely to require countries to look for a second best trade policy option.  
On the other hand, we have noticed that almost half of the RTAs notified to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO are currently inactive,1 even though 
the formation of an RTA is costly to both participating countries and the world economy. 
More strikingly, both regional and multilateral trade liberalization efforts have been seriously 
undermined by the global economic turbulence since the outbreak of the subprime mortgage 
crisis in U.S. In the face of growing demands for protectionist measures, we examine what 
practices might enable RTA partners to improve their conditions and at the same time foster 
multilateralization. The effectiveness of RTAs depends on their design and content, as well as 
the length of time they are in effect. More specifically, RTAs should create a significant 
positive welfare effect for all the member countries and for the global economy. Otherwise, 
RTAs could easily become ineffective over time. In addition to the positive gains to members 
and the global economy, the negative welfare effects on nonmembers should be minimized or 
avoided. 
A number of questions have previously been addressed concerning these issues. 
Some economists worry about the ‘spaghetti bowl phenomenon’ expected from the 
complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs). In 
particular, they are concerned that the additional cost of FTA administration for verifying 
rules of origin (RoO) and the trade diversion effect of RoO may offset or overwhelm the 
initial welfare gains from regional trade liberalization efforts.2 Baldwin (2006), 
Estevadeordal, Harris, and Suominen (2007), Gasiorek, Augier, and Lai-Tong (2007), and 
 
1 As of November 2008, 191 of 418 cumulated RTAs (45.7 percent) notified since 1948 have 
been inactive. See WTO web site, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm. 
2 RoO may divert trade from non-members to members, especially in the intermediate input 
sector, thereby increasing trade between members. However, the additional verifying costs of 
final products may weaken the trade creation effect. For a discussion of the importance of 
RoO in RTAs, see Estevadeordal and Suominen (2008). 
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Harris (2008) carefully evaluate the RoO-related costs and suggest that RTAs could be 
compatible with multilateralism through the harmonization and cumulation of RoO. In 
particular, Estevadeordal and Suominen (2003), Augier, Gasiorek, and Lai-Tong (2003), and 
Gasiorek, Augier, and Lai-Tong (2007) quantitatively estimate the trade effect of RoO, 
focusing on restrictiveness and different cumulation provisions of RoO by using Gravity 
regression analysis. They find that simple RoO and diagonal cumulation of RoO increase 
intraregional trade.  
 However, the existing studies simply measure the overall trade effect and do not 
distinguish between the trade creation and trade diversion effects. Moreover, the empirical 
evidence is limited to the diagonal cumulation case of the Pan-European Cumulation System 
(PECS). In order to find best practices for RTAs to enhance global free trade, it is necessary 
to clarify the trade effect on members and nonmembers more precisely and compare all the 
possible cumulation schemes. This research is an attempt to address this limitation of the 
existing literature.  
We consider another important issue of multilateral rules governing regionalism, 
GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause. The legal provisions strongly influence the 
trade effects of RTAs. In particular, we attempt to clarify whether the trade effects of RTAs 
under different legal provisions are affected by member-specific characteristics; that is, we 
compare trade effects of RTAs between north-north, north-south, and south-south under 
GATT Article XXIV. In addition, unlike existing empirical studies on this issue that cover a 
limited number of RTAs before 2000, we include almost all the RTAs notified to the 
GATT/WTO through 2005 (see Table 1). 
In sum, we attempt to propose best practices for RTAs as a way to enhance global 
free trade. For countries to avoid the negative effects of trade diversion and trade suppression, 
we recommend harmonization of RTAs incorporating more liberalized cumulation of RoO 
under GATT Article XXIV. In order to support this argument, we quantitatively estimate the 
trade creation and diversion effects of harmonized and cumulated RoO (bilateral, diagonal, 
and full cumulation) for RTAs established under GATT Article XXIV and under the Enabling 
Clause by adopting a Gravity regression analysis. The member-specific effects will be 
carefully considered. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the importance of 
harmonizing RTAs to promote global free trade and discusses some policy concerns related to 
harmonization. Section III specifies Gravity equations, describes data and estimation 
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techniques, and summarizes empirical findings to support our argument for multilateralizing 
regionalism through cumulated RoO with multilateral rules governing RTAs. Section IV 
concludes with our findings and implications. 
 
 
II. MULTILATERALIZING RTAs 
 
1. Best Practices for RTAs to Foster Global Free Trade 
 
To foster global free trade, best practices for RTAs should be designed to maximize 
their trade creation effect and minimize their trade diversion effect. In search of the best 
practices for RTAs, Plummer (2007) suggests ‘Ten Commandments’ to be considered and 
grades 11 active Asian FTAs3 from ‘A’ through ‘D’ according to each of the following 10 
conditions: comprehensive coverage of both goods and services within a reasonable period of 
time,4 low and symmetrical RoO, progress in trade facilitation, intellectual property 
protection, nondiscriminatory foreign direct investment-related provisions, transparent anti-
dumping procedures and dispute resolution, open and nondiscriminatory government 
procurement, competition policy, and low and standardized technical barriers to trade. The 11 
Asian FTAs receive passing grades for most of the commandments, except the condition for 
low and symmetrical RoO. Nine of 11 FTAs were graded as a problematic ‘C’ in that category. 
Elek (2005) suggests that the best practices for Asia-Pacific RTAs should include the 
following content: WTO-plus approach,5 comprehensive in scope (liberalizing all sectors and 
minimizing any phase-out periods for sensitive products), compatible with multilateral 
liberalization, simple RoO, transparency, and openness. Soesastro (2003) also emphasizes 
open accession, Most Favored Nation (MFN)-based multilateral liberalization approach, and 
harmonization of RoO.  
 
3 The 11 FTAs are AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), Singapore-New Zealand, EFTA 
(European Free Trade Association)-Singapore, Japan-Singapore, U.S.-Singapore, Australia-
Singapore, Korea-Chile, Japan-Mexico, Thailand-Australia, India-Singapore, and Korea-
Singapore. See Table 1 in Plummer (2007). 
4 This counts as two conditions, one for the goods sector and another for the services sector. 
5 Obligations exceeding the existing requirements of the WTO agreements—such as more 
restrictive requirements for investment, intellectual property, and services that oblige new 
members (mostly developing countries) to take on more commitments than existing members 
(mostly developed countries)—have been accepted in the WTO. 
6 
 
ade 
                                    
In sum, we propose to multilateralize RTAs by consolidating and harmonizing 
provisions of existing RTAs. In particular, we argue that consolidation and harmonization of 
RTAs through cumulation of common RoO and nondiscriminatory application of GATT 
Article XXIV should be considered for multilateralizing regionalism. 
 
2. Consolidating RTAs by Harmonizing and Cumulating RoO6 
 
RoO are necessary for discriminatory RTAs, including all FTAs, to determine the 
eligibility of members for preferential treatment. Duttagupta and Panagariya (2001) 
demonstrate that the RoO can improve the political viability of FTAs. On the other hand, 
acknowledging that the RoO result in additional costs of administration7 and may divert tr
from nonmembers, Brenton (2003) and Medalla (2008) propose simple and common RoO 
with more liberalized cumulation in order to reduce constraints on the choice of inputs for 
export production.  
To promote global free trade, best practices for RTAs should include harmonized 
common RoO to consolidate existing overlapping RTAs into a single comprehensive or a 
region-wide RTA. Overlapping RTAs could result in high costs for verifying RoO that exceed 
the initial gains from free trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers. In order to solve 
this problem, the region-wide RTA could amend the overlapping RTAs by developing one 
common set of RoO in which the product value is cumulated between different members, 
similar to the case of PECS for the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade 
 
6 As described in Gasiorek, Augier, and Lai-Tong (2007), there are three different types of 
cumulation−bilateral, diagonal, and full cumulation. The bilateral cumulation applies to a 
traditional bilateral FTA, which provides that materials originating in one country be 
considered materials originating in the partner country and vice versa. The diagonal 
cumulation applies to trade between three or more trading partners linked by FTAs with 
common RoO. It provides that materials originating in one country be considered materials 
originating in all of the partner countries. The full cumulation also applies to trade between 
three or more trading partners linked by FTAs with common RoO, but it is more flexible than 
the diagonal cumulation. It provides that all the materials used in the preferential area be 
considered materials satisfying the RoO. Customs unions are a good example of the full 
cumulation scheme. 
7 As surveyed by Medalla (2008), the administration cost varies; for example, 3 percent of 
the value of goods traded for EFTA countries, between 4-4.5 percent and 6-8 percent for other 
EU schemes, and around 6 percent for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
case. 
7 
 
                                    
Association (EFTA), and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC).8 The 
harmonized RoO of the diagonal cumulation system reduces the verifying costs at borders, 
produces positive investment creation effects, and is compatible with open regionalism by 
providing a friendly environment for new members.  
Alternatively, the region-wide RTA could consider implementing a full cumulation 
system and evolving to a customs union (CU) instead of an FTA.9 Krueger (1995) strongly 
argues that CUs are a better form of economic cooperation than FTAs by analyzing static net 
welfare gains and dynamic evolutionary paths. The negative opinion of FTAs among some 
economists is mainly based on the potential spaghetti bowl phenomenon from the hub-and-
spoke type of overlapping FTAs. Mirus and Rylska (2001) support Krueger’s (1995) 
argument by carefully describing the costs and the benefits of FTAs versus CUs, focusing on 
RoO and common external tariffs (CET).  
 
3. RTAs Compatible with Multilateralism: GATT Article XXIV 
 
Best practices for RTAs should be compatible with the GATT/WTO multilateralism 
by avoiding discriminatory preferential regionalism. The legal basis for the establishment of 
RTAs is provided by two GATT/WTO provisions: GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause.10 Depending on what provision the RTA is established under, there are significant 
differences in the scope of trade liberalization and the resulting trade effects. The most 
important requirements stipulated in GATT Article XXIV are that members (i) do not raise 
external trade barriers against nonmembers and (ii) eliminate duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce with respect to ‘substantially all trade’ within a reasonable length of 
 
8 The PECS was introduced in 1997 in order to remove impediments to duty-free trade in 
industrial goods across the EU, the EFTA and the CEEC. These member countries decided to 
amend their various FTAs by substituting one common set of RoO. Value could thus be 
cumulated between different European countries without prejudicing the duty-free status of 
end products (for more detailed information, see Stewart-Brown, 2001). For a discussion of 
multilateralizing regionalism in the case of PECS, see Baldwin (2006), Augier, Gasiorek, and 
Lai-Tong (2003), and Augier, Evans, Gasiorek, and Lai-Tong (2006). 
9 For empirical studies on trade effects of customs unions compared to FTAs, see Park and 
Park (2008), Magee (2008), Ghosh and Yamarik (2004), and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 
(2001). 
10 As of November 2008, 92 percent of RTAs had been notified to the GATT/WTO under 
GATT Article XXIV. More specifically, 323 of 351 RTAs since 1948 had been notified under 
GATT Article XXIV and the remaining 28 RTAs had been notified under the Enabling Clause. 
See WTO web site, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm. 
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time.  
The Enabling Clause is much less stringent than GATT Article XXIV. In effect, any 
RTA formed under the Enabling Clause does not require members to eliminate trade barriers 
with respect to ‘substantially all trade.’ Therefore, the lenient legal regime of the Enabling 
Clause makes the formation and expansion of an RTA much easier, especially for developing 
country members, but it may allow more exclusive lists to be effective. In order to maximize 
trade creation and minimize trade diversion effects of RTAs, Rajapatirana (1994) 
recommends not allowing RTAs to be formed under the Enabling Clause.  
On the contrary, an RTA established under GATT Article XXIV is expected to create 
more trade between members and divert less trade from nonmembers because it is based on 
the WTO’s MFN principle. Cooper and Massell (1965) argue that nondiscriminatory 
unilateral trade liberalization is superior to a discriminatory CU. In contrast, Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott (1981) claim that unilateral trade liberalization is not superior to a CU, but their 
argument is criticized by El-Agraa and Jones (2000) for inadequate exclusion of CET in their 
model. In a later paper, El Agraa (2002) addresses this inadequacy by incorporating GATT 
Article XXIV into the formation of a CU’s CET determination process and supports 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott’s (1981) argument supporting a CU over unilateral liberalization. 
 
 
III. TRADE EFFECTS OF RTAs: A GRAVITY REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
1. Model Specifications, Data, and Estimation Techniques 
 
We employ an extended Gravity model of bilateral trade flows to estimate the trade 
effects of RTAs with different RoO cumulation and legal bases. 
 
Equation (1) as a reference case: 
ln(Tradeijt) = α0 + α1ln(GDPitGDPjt) + α2ln(DISTij) + β’X’ + γ1RTA/Insidersijt 
+ γ2RTA/Outsidersijt + δ Yeart + εijt 
 
Equation (2) for multilateral rules governing regionalism: 
ln(Tradeijt) = α0 + α1ln(GDPitGDPjt) + α2ln(DISTij) + β’X’ + γ3RTA/GATT/Insidersijt 
+ γ4RTA/GATT/Outsidersijt + γ5RTA/Enabling/Insidersijt 
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+ γ6RTA/Enabling/Outsidersijt + δ Yeart + εijt 
 
Equation (3) for harmonizing RoO: 
ln(Tradeijt) = α0 + α1ln(GDPitGDPjt) + α2ln(DISTij) + β’X’ + γ7RTA/Bilateral/Insidersijt 
 + γ8RTA/Bilateral/Outsidersijt + γ9RTA/Diagonal/Insidersijt 
 + γ10RTA/Diagonal/Outsidersijt + γ11RTA/Full/Insidersijt 
 + γ12RTA/Full/Outsidersijt + δ Yeart + εijt 
 
Equation (4) for best practices RTAs: 
ln(Tradeijt) = α0 + α1ln(GDPitGDPjt) + α2ln(DISTij) + β’X’ 
+ γ13RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Insidersijt + γ14RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Outsidersijt 
+ γ15RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Insidersijt + γ16RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Outsidersijt 
+ γ17RTA/FullGATT//Insidersijt + γ18RTA/Full/GATT/Outsidersijt 
+ γ19RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Insidersijt + γ20RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Outsidersijt 
+ δ Yeart + εijt 
 
where i and j denote particular countries, and t denotes time, 
 
z Tradeijt denotes the value of the bilateral trade between i and j at time t,   
z GDP is real GDP,  
z Dist is the distance between i and j, 
z X is a set of control variables that includes border, common language, and colony 
dummy, 
z RTA/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same RTA, 
z RTA/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA and j does 
not or vice versa,  
z RTA/GATT/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same 
RTA formed under GATT Article XXIV, 
z RTA/GATT/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
formed under GATT Article XXIV and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Enabling/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the 
same RTA formed under the Enabling Clause, 
10 
 
z RTA/Enabling/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
formed under the Enabling Clause and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Bilateral/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to an RTA 
formed with bilateral cumulation,  
z RTA/Bilateral/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
formed with bilateral cumulation and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Diagonal/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to an RTA 
formed with diagonal cumulation,  
z RTA/Diagonal/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
formed with diagonal cumulation and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Full/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to an RTA 
formed with full cumulation,  
z RTA/Full/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA formed 
with full cumulation and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to 
an RTA formed with bilateral cumulation under GATT Article XXIV, 
z RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an 
RTA formed with bilateral cumulation under GATT Article XXIV and j does not or 
vice versa, 
z RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to 
an RTA formed with diagonal cumulation under GATT Article XXIV, 
z RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an 
RTA formed with diagonal cumulation under GATT Article XXIV and j does not or 
vice versa, 
z RTA/Full/GATT/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to an 
RTA formed with full cumulation under GATT Article XXIV, 
z RTA/Full/GATT/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
formed with full cumulation under GATT Article XXIV and j does not or vice versa, 
z RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong 
to an RTA formed with bilateral cumulation under the Enabling Clause, 
z RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to 
an RTA formed with bilateral cumulation under the Enabling Clause and j does not or 
vice versa, 
11 
 
                                    
z Year denotes a set of binary variables which is unity in the specific year t. 
 
The data for the Gravity model in this study come from various sources. The trade 
flow data come from the Direction of Trade Statistics provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for the periods 1980-2005 for 154 countries. Nominal value of bilateral trade is 
measured by the sum of the bilateral exports. These data are deflated by GDP deflators to 
generate real trade flows. The data for Real GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) are from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data on country pair specific variables, 
such as distance, colonial ties, common land border, and common languages, are obtained 
from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook. We include most of the RTAs 
notified to the GATT/WTO under GATT XXIV or the Enabling Clause. Table 1 lists the 
RTAs included in this analysis.  
In the estimations of equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) 
and Magee (2008) indicate that there is a problem of heteroskedasticity. Moreover, bilateral 
trade values can be zero; that is, some pairs of countries did not trade in a certain year. The 
most common approach to solving this problem is to exclude the country pairs with no trade. 
However, Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) show that a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique provides consistent estimates of the parameters in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and zero trade values. Contrary to these arguments, 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2006) show that the PPML estimation is not always the best 
estimator, because small changes in the simulation setting can lead to different outcomes. 
Therefore, we apply two different estimation techniques: the PPML estimation including the 
zero trade values and the standard panel data estimation excluding the zero trade values with 
fixed and random effects.11  
 
11 In this research, we only report results from the PPML estimation with fixed and random 
effects because it includes the zero trade values in a certain year and performs better than the 
standard panel data estimation. On the other hand, there are two different estimation 
techniques in the panel setting: random effects and fixed effects. The random effects 
estimation assumes that the individual country pair effect is a random variable. In contrast, 
the fixed effects method assumes the presence of unobserved country specific factors. The 
fixed effects estimation can help to alleviate potential specification errors from omitted 
variables, a cause of an endogeneity problem. The generally accepted way of choosing 
between fixed and random effects is performing the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 
1978), which compares the fixed to random effects under the null hypothesis that the 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. We conducted the 
Hausman test and found that the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, our empirical analysis will 
12 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
2. Summary Statistics 
 
The estimations use annual data consisting of 210,095 country pairs in total. The 
number of observations varies per year. Summary statistics for the data used in the 
estimations are presented in Table 2. Of all observations, 10,692 country pairs (5.1 percent) 
belong to RTAs (“insiders”) and 163,549 country pairs (77.8 percent) belong to the member-
nonmember (“outsiders”) relationship. The 62.1 (14.6 and 23.3) percent of 12,522 country 
pairs apply bilateral (diagonal and full, respectively) cumulation of RoO to members in the 
RTAs. The 64.8 (35.2) percent of 10,725 country pairs form RTAs under GATT Article XXIV 
(the Enabling Clause, respectively). The 41.4 (28.2 and 30.5) percent of 6,946 country pairs 
form RTAs between developed (developed-developing and developing, respectively) 
countries under GATT Article XXIV. 
In Table 2, we observe some notable findings. First, the bilateral trade between RTA 
members is almost twice as high as the average bilateral trade in the whole sample. On the 
other hand, the logarithmic mean of trade (2.23) in column (3) is comparable to that (2.38) in 
column (1), indicating that the bilateral trade between members and nonmembers is not much 
smaller than the average volume of bilateral trade in the whole sample. From these figures, 
we may expect that RTAs create more trade among members without seriously diverting trade 
from nonmembers. However, this is a casual observation because other important variables, 
such as year and country size, are not controlled. In addition, self-selection may have played 
an important role in generating a large trade volume between RTA members because 
countries that trade with each other more are likely to form RTAs in the first place. Second, 
there is no significant difference in economic size for the membership of RTAs, but 
geographical distance is very important for the membership. Thirdly, RTA membership seems 
to have been chosen after taking account of specific, possibly exogenous, country 
characteristics. RTA member countries are more likely to share a common land border and 
common language, but not necessarily a common historical background. 
Focusing on the cumulation of RoO, bilateral trade between members is much higher 
than the trade between members and nonmembers; this is similar to the average case without 
classifying the type of RoO cumulation. Moreover, regardless of the membership, the 
bilateral trade of country pairs increases as the type of RoO cumulation is deepened and 
 
focus more on the results from the fixed effect estimation. 
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liberalized. Richer countries adopt more liberalized cumulation schemes as indicated by the 
mean values of the log of GDP in pairs. The transportation cost resulting from distance does 
not affect the choice of cumulation scheme. The country specific characteristics, such as 
border sharing, common languages, and colonial background, do not reveal any specific 
pattern. No surprising characteristic was evident from the different legal bases of RTA 
formation. As we expect, the bilateral trade and economic size between RTA members under 
the Enabling Clause is smaller than that under GATT Article XXIV. 
 
3. Empirical Results  
 
Tables 3-5 report econometric results from the Gravity regression analysis of RTA 
trade effects by provisions related to the cumulations of RoO and the legal basis for 
GATT/WTO compatibility. Table 6 summarizes the trade effects of RTAs by type of 
provisions searching for best practices RTAs. 
Equations (1) and (3) in Table 3 present the estimation results of the impact of RTAs 
on intra- and extra-bloc membership in general. As we interpret the random effects in 
equation (3), the conventional variables behave the way the model predicts and the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant, excluding the statistically insignificant border dummy. 
To summarize briefly, the estimated coefficient on bilateral distance is significantly negative. 
The estimated coefficients on log of GDP in pairs, common language dummy, and colony 
dummy are all significantly positive. This indicates that the transaction cost, market size, and 
historical background matter for increasing bilateral trade. 
From equation (1) of the fixed effect estimation, estimated coefficient on the RTA 
membership dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. The estimate on the 
intra-bloc membership implies that a pair of countries that joins an RTA experiences a 3.5 
percent increase in trade, with other variables constant.12 The estimate on the extra-bloc 
dummy variable is negative and statistically significant. The estimate implies that RTA 
members’ trade with nonmembers is estimated to fall by 11.6 percent. Hence, RTAs in 
general increase trade among members and divert trade from other countries that do not 
belong to the bloc. 
 
 
12 Since exp0.034=1.035, an increase from zero (no membership) to one (membership) in the 
RTA dummy variable raises bilateral trade by 3.5 percent. 
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A. Multilateral Rules Governing Regionalism: GATT Article XXIV vs Enabling Clause 
 
Equations (2) and (4) in Table 3 and Table 6 summarize the effects of RTAs by legal 
provision on bilateral trade flows. We compare the relative effects of RTAs established under 
GATT Article XXIV to RTAs established under the Enabling Clause. The RTAs under GATT 
Article XXIV create more intra-bloc trade (8.2 percent > 3.5 percent) and divert less extra-
bloc trade (-8.1 percent > -11.6 percent) than RTAs on average in Equation (1). The trade 
creation effect under the Enabling Clause is negative (-7.1 percent), and the trade diversion is 
somewhat stronger (-8.6 percent) than that under GATT Article XXIV. This result supports 
our argument favoring more strict application of WTO’s multilateral principle to RTAs. 
The relatively more favorable outcomes of RTAs under GATT Article XXIV 
compared to those under the Enabling Clause could be caused by member-specific 
characteristics; that is, the different trade effects are the result not of different legal provisions 
but of different membership combinations. In order to check whether the member-specific 
characteristics matter, we divide the set of GATT/Insiders into the following three subsets: 
GATT/North-North Insiders, GATT/North-South Insiders, and GATT/South-South Insiders.13 
We then reestimate the following equation. 
 
ln(Tradeijt) = α0 + α1ln(GDPitGDPjt) + α2ln(DISTij) + β’X’ 
+ γ3RTA/GATT/North-North Insidersijt + γ4RTA/GATT/North-South Insidersijt 
+ γ5RTA/GATT/South-South Insidersijt + γ6RTA/GATT/Outsidersijt  
+ γ7RTA/Enabling/Insidersijt + γ8RTA/Enabling/Outsidersijt + δ Yeart + εijt 
 
where  
z RTA/GATT/North-North Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong 
to the same RTA formed between developed countries under GATT Article XXIV, 
z RTA/GATT/North-South Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong 
to the same RTA formed between developed and developing countries under GATT 
Article XXIV, and 
z RTA/GATT/South-South Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong 
to the same RTA formed between developing countries under GATT Article XXIV. 
 
13 The classification of North and South is based on Subramanian and Wei (2003). 
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Equations (5)-(8) in Table 4 summarize trade effects of RTAs taking into account member-
specific characteristics. We find that RTAs with developed countries create more trade 
between members, indicating that the member-specific characteristics are important factors. 
However, this finding does not undermine our argument in favor of RTAs established under 
GATT Article XXIV over those established under the Enabling Clause. The three different 
membership combinations of RTAs under GATT Article XXIV create more trade between 
members compared to RTAs under the Enabling Clause. This result clearly supports our 
argument favoring more strict application of WTO’s multilateral principle to RTAs as a best 
practice. 
 
B. Harmonizing RoO: Bilateral, Diagonal, and Full Cumulation 
 
Equations (9) and (11) in Table 5 and Table 6 estimate the trade effects of RTAs with 
different cumulation schemes. Analyzing the fixed effect estimation in Equation (9), full 
cumulation (35.8 percent) is the best option in terms of trade creation effect, followed by 
diagonal cumulation (16.0 percent). The trade creation effect of bilateral cumulation is 
limited to 0.9 percent insignificantly. Diagonal cumulation diverts the largest volume of trade 
from nonmembers to members (-16.0 percent) among the three schemes. Overall, full 
cumulation is the optimal provision of RoO cumulation in terms of creating the most intra-
bloc trade (35.8 percent) and diverting the least extra-bloc trade (-3.1 percent). 
 
C. Best Practices for RTAs 
 
Equations (10) and (12) in Table 3 and Table 6 estimate the trade effects of RTAs 
with different cumulation schemes under different legal provisions using two dummies that 
interact. Again analyzing the fixed effect estimation in the Equation (10), full cumulation 
under GATT Article XXIV is the best option in terms of creating the most intra-bloc trade 
(34.9 percent) and diverting the least extra-bloc trade (-1.8 percent). We do not compare each 
of the interacted cases with the Enabling Clause case because we do not have RTAs with 
diagonal or full cumulation in our data set. However, comparing RTAs with bilateral 
cumulation under the Enabling Clause, we argue that RTAs should be established under 
GATT Article XXIV. 
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Table 6 also summarizes the estimation results for the best practices RTAs by 
different types of provisions. As shown by the relative trade effects to the general RTA case 
as a ratio, full cumulation under GATT Article XXIV is the best RTA framework and the hub-
and-spoke type of bilateral RTA should be avoided. As Rajapatirana (1994) and Baldwin 
(2006) note, RTAs should not be established under the Enabling Clause. As an alternative to 
full cumulation, we propose diagonal cumulation to boost spoke-to-spoke trade, but this may 
not be the most effective way to foster global free trade because of the significant trade 
diversion effect expected. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this research, we proposed some policy options in search of best practices for 
RTAs as a way to foster global free trade. More specifically, we quantitatively estimated the 
trade creation and diversion effects of harmonized and cumulated RoO (bilateral, diagonal, 
and full cumulation) for RTAs established under GATT Article XXIV and under the Enabling 
Clause by adopting a Gravity regression analysis. 
We found that (i) RTAs in general create trade among members and divert trade from 
countries that do not belong to the bloc; (ii) RTAs should be established under the 
comprehensive GATT Article XXIV, rather than under the piecemeal Enabling Clause; and 
(iii) full cumulation is the optimal provision of RoO cumulation in terms of creating the most 
intra-bloc trade and diverting the least extra-bloc trade.  
Overall, we strongly recommend that RTAs should employ full cumulation of RoO 
under GATT Article XXIV. This strategy will enable regionalism to be compatible with 
multilateralism, to be sustainable in the long run, and finally to lead us to global free trade. 
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Table 1. Classification of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
 
Legal Provisions RTAs 
GATT Article XXIV 
ANZCERTA, CACM, Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica, Canada-
Israel, CARICOM, CEFTA, CIS, Chile-El Salvador, Chile-
Mexico, Chile-Costa Rica, Costa Rica-Mexico, EC, EC-Algeria, 
EC-Chile, EC-Croatia, EC-Egypt, EC-FYROM, EC-Iceland, EC-
Israel, EC-Jordan, EC-Lebanon, EC-Morocco, EC-Norway, EC-
South Africa, EC-Switzerland, EC-Syria, EC-Tunisia, EC-Turkey, 
EFTA, EFTA-Chile, EFTA-Croatia, EFTA-FYROM, EFTA-Israel, 
EFTA-Jordan, EFTA-Morocco, EFTA-Singapore, EFTA-Tunisia, 
EFTA-Turkey, El Salvador-Mexico, Guatemala-Mexico, 
Honduras-Mexico, India-Singapore, Israel-Mexico, Japan-
Singapore, Japan-Mexico, Jordan-Singapore, Korea-Chile, 
Mexico-Nicaragua, NAFTA, New Zealand-Singapore, Pan-Arab 
FTA, Panama-El Salvador, PATCRA, Thailand-Australia, 
Thailand-New Zealand, Turkey-Croatia, Turkey-Israel, Turkey-
FYROM, Turkey-Bosnia and Herzogovina, Turkey-Tunisia, 
SACU, Singapore-Australia, USA-Australia, USA-Chile, USA-
Israel, USA-Jordan, USA-Singapore 
Enabling Clause AFTA, CAN, CEMAC, COMESA, EAC, GCC, MERCOSUR, PATCRA, WAEMU 
 
Provisions related to 
RoO Cumulation RTAs 
Diagonal Cumulation
PANEURO (EC 15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey), 
Canada-Israel 
Full Cumulation EEA excluding Switzerland, EC-Morocco, EC-Tunisia, EC-Algeria, ANZCERTA 
Bilateral Cumulation Rest of RTAs 
 
Note: ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), Central American Common Market 
(CACM), Andean Community (CAN), Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East 
African Community (EAC), European Communities (EC), European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Papua New Guinea 
- Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA), Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU), and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 
All 
(N =210,095 ) 
RTA/Insiders 
(N =10,692) 
RTA/Outsiders 
(N =163,549) 
Mean Standard Deviation (SD) Mean 
Standard Deviation 
(SD) Mean Standard Deviation (SD) 
Log of Trade 2.38 2.97 4.41 3.45 2.23 2.81 
Log of GDP in pairs 21.27 2.77 21.43 3.80 21.34 2.70 
Log of Distance 8.20 0.79 6.88 0.81 8.30 0.70 
Common Land Border 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.38 0.01 0.10 
Common Language 0.18 0.39 0.38 0.49 0.17 0.38 
Colony 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.12 
 
RTA/ 
Bilateral/Insiders 
(N=7,775) 
RTA/ 
Bilateral/Outsiders 
(N=100,097) 
RTA/ 
Diagonal/Insiders 
(N=1,833) 
RTA/ 
Diagonal/Outsiders 
(N=13,950) 
RTA/ 
Full/Insiders 
(N=2,914) 
RTA/ 
Full/Outsiders 
(N=53,394) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log of Trade 3.23 3.10 1.69 2.67 5.64 2.07 2.08 2.25 7.24 2.41 3.46 2.89 
Log of GDP in pairs 20.17 3.56 20.71 2.67 23.47 1.76 21.89 2.37 24.72 1.98 22.51 2.45 
Log of Distance 6.94 0.84 8.32 0.71 6.63 0.62 8.14 0.72 6.80 0.68 8.23 0.69 
Common Land Border 0.19 0.39 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.32 0.01 0.08 
Common Language 0.49 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35 
Colony 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 
 
RTA/GATT 
/Insiders 
(N=6,946) 
RTA/GATT/North-
North Insiders 
(N=2,873) 
RTA/GATT/North-
South Insiders 
(N=1,956) 
RTA/GATT/South-
South Insiders 
(N=2,117) 
RTA/GATT 
/Outsiders 
(N=125,202) 
RTA/Enabling 
/Insiders 
(N=3,779) 
RTA/Enabling 
/Outsiders 
(N=84,548) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log of Trade 5.61 3.02 7.86 2.04 5.33 2.26 2.83 2.23 2.67 2.89 2.20 3.07 1.81 2.69 
Log of GDP in pairs 22.47 4.05 24.70 2.07 23.97 1.97 18.07 4.02 21.69 2.77 19.53 2.28 21.14 2.52 
Log of Distance 6.89 0.90 6.68 0.62 7.56 0.74 6.50 1.00 8.24 0.75 6.89 0.63 8.37 0.60 
Common Land Border 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.35 0.01 0.11 0.30 0.46 0.01 0.10 
Common Language 0.31 0.46 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.82 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.40 
Colony 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.10 
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Table 3. Trade Effect of RTAs: Gravity Regression Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(Tradeij)  
PPML with Fixed Effect PPML with Random Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(GDPiGDPj)  0.561 
(0.007)*** 
0.566 
(0.007)*** 
0.482 
(0.004)*** 
0.483 
(0.004)*** 
ln(Distij)    -0.603 
(0.014)*** 
-0.600 
(0.014)*** 
Border   -0.068 
(0.073) 
-0.041 
(0.073) 
Colony   0.399 
(0.093)*** 
0.394 
(0.093)*** 
Common Language   0.389 
(0.029)*** 
0.396 
(0.029)*** 
RTA/Insiders 0.034 
(0.011)*** 
 0.051 
(0.011)*** 
 
RTA/Outsiders -0.123 
(0.006)*** 
 -0.110 
(0.006)*** 
 
RTA/GATT/Insiders  0.079 
(0.012)*** 
 0.094 
(0.010)*** 
RTA/GATT/Outsiders  -0.085 
(0.006)*** 
 -0.074 
(0.006)*** 
RTA/Enabling/Insiders  -0.074 
(0.025)*** 
 -0.074 
(0.024)** 
RTA/Enabling/Outsiders  -0.090 
(0.007)*** 
 -0.078 
(0.006)*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202,808 202,808 210,095 210,095 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept is included but not reported. *, **, and 
*** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. For the PPML estimation with fixed effect, 7,287 
observations out of 210,095 observations are dropped due to all zero outcomes for all 
the periods covered.  
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Table 4. Trade Effect of RTAs with Member-specific Characteristics 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(Tradeij)  
PPML with Fixed Effect PPML with Random Effect 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln(GDPiGDPj)  0.549 
(0.007)*** 
0.568 
(0.007)*** 
0.479 
(0.004)*** 
0.484 
(0.004)*** 
ln(Distij)    -0.606 
(0.014)*** 
-0.600 
(0.014)*** 
Border   -0.050 
(0.073) 
-0.041 
(0.073) 
Colony   0.409 
(0.093)*** 
0.391 
(0.093)*** 
Common Language   0.385 
(0.029)*** 
0.399 
(0.029)*** 
RTA/GATT/North-North 
Insiders 
0.254 
(0.021)*** 
0.245 
(0.021)*** 
0.235 
(0.021)*** 
0.223 
(0.020)*** 
RTA/GATT/North-South 
Insiders 
0.042 
(0.015)*** 
0.034 
(0.015)** 
0.053 
(0.015)*** 
0.044 
(0.015)*** 
RTA/GATT/South-South 
Insiders 
0.010 
(0.022) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
0.078 
(0.022)*** 
0.078 
(0.022)*** 
RTA/GATT/Outsiders -0.087 
(0.006)*** 
-0.082 
(0.006)*** 
-0.075 
(0.006)*** 
-0.073 
(0.006)*** 
RTA/Enabling/Insiders  -0.069 
(0.025)*** 
 -0.048 
(0.024)** 
RTA/Enabling/Outsiders  -0.090 
(0.007)*** 
 -0.078 
(0.006)*** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202,808 202,808 210,095 210,095 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept is included but not reported. *, **, and 
*** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. For the PPML estimation with fixed effect, 7,287 
observations out of 210,095 observations are dropped due to all zero outcomes for all 
the periods covered.  
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Table 5. Trade Effect of RTAs with Harmonizing RoO and Governing GATT Article 
XXIV 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(Tradeij) 
PPML with Fixed Effect PPML with Random Effect
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
RTA/Bilateral/Insiders 0.009 
(0.012) 
 0.029 
(0.011)*** 
 
RTA/Bilateral/Outsiders -0.094 
(0.006)***
 -0.087 
(0.006)*** 
 
RTA/Diagonal/Insiders 0.148 
(0.014)***
 0.122 
(0.014)*** 
 
RTA/Diagonal/Outsiders -0.174 
(0.009)***
 -0.172 
(0.009)*** 
 
RTA/Full/Insiders 0.306 
(0.015)***
 0.304 
(0.015)*** 
 
RTA/Full/Outsiders -0.032 
(0.009)***
 -0.015 
(0.008)* 
 
RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Insiders  0.038 
(0.013)***
 0.059 
(0.013)***
RTA/Bilateral/GATT/Outsiders  -0.060 
(0.006)***
 -0.056 
(0.006) 
RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Insiders  0.202 
(0.030)***
 0.187 
(0.030)***
RTA/Diagonal/GATT/Outsiders  -0.160 
(0.009)***
 -0.156 
(0.009)***
RTA/Full/GATT/Insiders  0.299 
(0.016)***
 0.303 
(0.015)***
RTA/Full/GATT/Outsiders  -0.018 
(0.009)** 
 -0.001 
(0.008) 
RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Insiders  -0.059 
(0.025)** 
 -0.035 
(0.024) 
RTA/Bilateral/Enabling/Outsiders  -0.082 
(0.007)***
 -0.071 
(0.007)***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202,808 202,808 210,095 210,095 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept is included but not reported. *, **, and 
*** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. For the PPML estimation with fixed effect, 7,287 
observations out of 210,095 observations are dropped due to all zero outcomes for all 
the periods covered.  
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Table 6. Best Practices for RTAs 
 
Absolute Trade Effects (%) Fixed Effect Random Effect Trade Creation Trade Diversion Trade Creation Trade Diversion 
RTA in General 3.5  -11.6 5.2 -10.4  
GATT Article XXIV 8.2  -8.1 9.9 -7.1**  
Enabling Clause -7.1  -8.6 -7.1** -7.5  
Bilateral Cumulation 0.9#  -9.0 2.9 -8.3  
Diagonal Cumulation 16.0  -16.0  13.0  -15.8  
Full Cumulation 35.8  -3.1 35.5 -1.5*  
Bilateral Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 3.9  -5.8  6.1  -5.4#  
Diagonal Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 22.4  -14.8 20.6 -14.4  
Full Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 34.9  -1.8** 35.4 -0.1#  
Bilateral Cumulation and the Enabling Clause -5.7**  -7.9  -0.1#  -3.4  
Relative Trade Effects to the General Case (Ratio) Trade Creation Trade Diversion Trade Creation Trade Diversion 
RTA in General 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  
GATT Article XXIV 2.38  0.70  1.88  0.68**  
Enabling Clause -3.06  0.74 -2.36** 0.72  
Bilateral Cumulation 0.26#  0.78 0.56 0.80  
Diagonal Cumulation 4.61  1.38 2.48 1.52  
Full Cumulation 10.35  0.27  6.79  0.14*  
Bilateral Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 1.12  0.50 1.16 0.52#  
Diagonal Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 6.47  1.28  3.93  1.39  
Full Cumulation and GATT Article XXIV 10.08  0.15** 6.76 0.01#  
Bilateral Cumulation and the Enabling Clause -2.66**  0.68 -1.02# 0.33  
 
Note: All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent but #, *, and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, significant at 10 percent, and at 5 percent, respectively.  
